The microfinance revolution: an overview by Rajdeep Sengupta & Craig P. Aubuchon
FEDERAL RESERVE BANK OF ST. LOUIS REVIEW JANUARY/FEBRUARY 2008 9
The Microfinance Revolution: An Overview
Rajdeep Sengupta and Craig P. Aubuchon
The Nobel Prize committee awarded the 2006 Nobel Peace Prize to Muhammad Yunus and the
Grameen Bank “for their efforts to create economic and social development from below.” The
microfinance revolution has come a long way since Yunus first provided financing to the poor in
Bangladesh. The committee has recognized microfinance as “an important liberating force” and
an “ever more important instrument in the struggle against poverty.” Although several authors
have provided comprehensive surveys of microfinance, our aim is somewhat more modest: This
article is intended as a non-technical overview on the growth and development of microcredit
and microfinance. (JEL I3, J41, N80)
Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis Review, January/February 2008, 90(1), pp. 9-30.
In its broadest sense, microcredit includes
the act of providing loans of small amounts, often
$100 or less, to the poor and other borrowers that
have been ignored by commercial banks; under
this definition, microcredit encompasses all
lenders, including the formal participants (such
as specialized credit cooperatives set up by the
government for the provision of rural credit)
and those of a more informal variety (such as the
village moneylender or even loan sharks). Yunus
(2007) argues that it is important to distinguish
microcredit in all its previous forms from the
specific form of credit adopted at the Grameen
Bank, which he calls “Grameencredit.” Yunus
argues that the “most distinctive feature of
Grameencredit is that it is not based on any col-
lateral, or legally enforceable contracts. It is based
on ‘trust,’ not on legal procedures and system.”
For the purposes of this article and unless men-
tioned otherwise, our use of the term microcredit
I
n 2006, the Grameen Bank and its founder
Muhammad Yunus were awarded the
Nobel Peace Prize for their efforts to reduce
poverty in Bangladesh. By providing small
loans to the extremely poor, the Grameen Bank
offers these recipients the chance to become
entrepreneurs and earn sufficiently high income
to break themselves free from the cycle of poverty.
Yunus’s pioneering efforts have brought renewed
attention to the field of microfinance as a tool to
eliminate poverty; and, since 1976 when he first
lent $27 to 42 stool makers, the Grameen Bank
has grown to include more than 5.5 million mem-
bers with greater than $5.2 billion in dispersed
loans. As microfinance institutions continue to
grow and expand, in both the developing and
developed world, social activists and financial
investors alike have begun to take notice. In this
article we seek to explain the rise in microfinance
since its inception in the early 1980s and the
various mechanisms that make microfinance
an effective tool in reducing poverty.1 We also
address the current problems facing microfinance
and areas for future growth.
1 Other, more technical surveys of microfinance include Ghatak and
Guinnane (1999), Morduch (1999), and Armendáriz de Aghion
and Morduch (2005).
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ization of Grameencredit.
Although the terms microcredit and micro-
finance are often used interchangeably, it is
important to recognize the distinction between
the two. As mentioned before, microcredit refers
to the act of providing the loan. Microfinance,
on the other hand, is the act of providing these
same borrowers with financial services, such as
savings institutions and insurance policies. In
short, microfinance encompasses the field of
microcredit. Currently, it is estimated that any-
where from 1,000 to 2,500 microfinance institu-
tions (MFIs) serve some 67.6 million clients in
over 100 different countries.2
Many MFIs have a dual mandate to provide
financial as well as social services, such as health
care and educational services for the underprivi-
leged. In this sense, they are not always perceived
as profit-maximizing financial institutions. At
the same time, the remarkable accomplishment
of microfinance lies in the fact that some of the
successful MFIs report high rates of repayment,
sometimes above 95 percent. This rate demon-
strates that lending to underprivileged borrow-
ers—those without credit histories or the assets
to post collateral—can be a financially sustainable
venture.
Not surprisingly, philanthropy is not a
requirement of microfinance—not all MFIs are
non-profit organizations. While MFIs such as
Banco Sol of Bolivia operate with the intent to
return a profit, other MFIs like the Grameen Bank
charge below-market rates to promote social
equity.3 As will be discussed below, this distinc-
tion is important: As the microfinance industry
continues to grow and MFIs serve a wider client
base, the commercial viability of an MFI is often
viewed as crucial for its access to more main-
stream sources of finance. (We will return to this
and related queries in the “The Evidence of
Microfinance” section of this paper.) The next
section offers a brief history of the Grameen Bank
and a discussion of its premier innovation of
group lending contracts; the following sections
describe the current state of microfinance and
provide a review of some of the common percep-
tions on microfinance. The final section outlines
the future of microfinance, particularly in the
context of global capital markets.
A BRIEF HISTORY OF THE
GRAMEEN BANK
The story of the Grameen Bank is a suitable
point to begin a discussion of microcredit and
microfinance. After obtaining a PhD in economics
in 1969 and then teaching in the United States
for a few years, Muhammad Yunus returned to
Bangladesh in 1972. Following its independence
from Pakistan in 1971 and two years of flooding,
Bangladesh found itself in the grips of a terrible
famine. By 1974, over 80 percent of the popula-
tion was living in abject poverty (Yunus, 2003).
Yunus, then a professor of economics at
Chittagong University in southeast Bangladesh,
became disillusioned with economics: “Nothing
in the economic theories I taught reflected the life
around me. How could I go on telling my students
make believe stories in the name of economics?”
(See Yunus, 2003, p. viii.) He ventured into the
nearby village of Jobra to learn from the poor what
causes their poverty. Yunus soon realized that it
was their lack of access to credit that held them
in poverty. Hence, the origins of “microfinance”
emerged from this experience when Yunus lent
$27 of his own money to 42 women involved in
the manufacturing of bamboo stools.4
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2 Microfinance Information Exchange (MIX) lists financial profiles
and data for 973 MFIs. The high estimate of 2,500 comes from a
survey conducted by the Microcredit Summit Campaign in 2002.
3 The social objectives of the Grameen Bank are summarized by the
16 decisions in their mission statement. The statement is available
at http://grameen-info.org/bank/the16.html.
4 Yunus (2003) describes his conversation with Sufiya, a stool maker.
She had no money to buy the bamboo for her stools. Instead, she
was forced to buy the raw materials and sell her stools through the
same middleman. After extracting interest on the loan that Sufiya
used to buy the bamboo that morning, the moneylender left her
with a profit of only 2 cents for the day. Sufiya was poor not for
lack of work or skills, but because she lacked the necessary credit
to break free from a moneylender. With the help of a graduate stu-
dent, Yunus surveyed Jobra and found 41 other women just like
Sufiya. Disillusioned by the poverty around him and questioning
what could be done, Yunus lent $27 dollars to these 42 women
and asked that he be repaid whenever they could afford it.Through a series of trials and errors, Yunus
settled on a working model and by 1983, under a
special charter from the Bangladesh government,
founded the Grameen Bank as a formal and inde-
pendent financial institution. Grameen is derived
from the Bengali word gram, which means village;
grameen literally means “of the village,” an appro-
priate name for a lending institution that requires
the cooperation of the villagers. The Grameen
Bank targets the poor, with the goal of lending
primarily to women. Since its inception, the
Grameen Bank has experienced high growth rates
and now has more than 5.5 million members
(see Figure 1), more than 95 percent of whom are
women.5
Lending to poor villagers involves a signifi-
cant credit risk because the poor are believed to
be uncreditworthy: That is, they lack the skills
or the expertise needed to put the borrowed
funds to their best possible use. Consequently,
mainstream banks have for the most part denied
the poor access to credit. The Grameen Bank has
challenged decades of thinking and received
wisdom on lending to the poor. It has success-
fully demonstrated this in two ways: First, it has
shown that poor households can benefit from
greater access to credit and that the provision of
credit can be an effective tool for poverty allevia-
tion. Second, it has proven that institutions do
not necessarily suffer heavy losses from lending
to the poor. An obvious question, though, is how
the Grameen Bank succeeded where so many oth-
ers have failed. The answer, according to most
economists, lies in its unique group lending
contracts, which enabled the Grameen Bank to
ensure repayment without requiring collateral
from the poor.
The Group Lending Innovation
This Grameen Bank lending model can be
described as follows: Borrowers organize them-
selves into a group of five and present themselves
to the Bank. After agreeing to the Bank rules, the
first two members of the group receive a loan. If
the first two successfully repay their loans, then
Sengupta and Aubuchon
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Figure 1
Grameen Bank Membershipfour to six weeks later the next two are offered
loans; after another four to six weeks, the last per-
son is finally offered a loan. As long as all mem-
bers in the group repay their loans, the promise
of future credit is extended. If any member of the
group defaults on a loan, then all members are
denied access to future credit. Furthermore, eight
groups of Grameen borrowers are organized into
centers and repayment is collected during public
meetings. While this ensures transparency, any
borrower who defaults is visible to the entire
village, which imposes a sense of shame. In rural
Bangladesh, this societal pressure is a strong dis-
incentive to default on the loan. Initial loans are
small, generally less than $100, and require weekly
repayments that amount to a rate of 10 percent
per annum.6 Weekly repayments give the borrow-
ers and lenders the added benefit of discovering
problems early.
Group lending—or the joint liability con-
tract—is the most celebrated lending innovation
by the Grameen Bank. Economies of scale moti-
vated its first use, and Yunus later found that the
benefits of group lending were manifold. Under
a joint liability contract, the members within the
group (who are typically neighbors in the village)
can help mitigate the problems that an outside
lender would face. Outside lenders such as banks
and government-sponsored agencies face what
economists call agency costs. For example, they
cannot ensure that the borrowed money be put to
its most productive use (moral hazard), cannot
verify success or failure of the proposed business
(costly state verification/auditing), and cannot
enforce repayment. It is not difficult to see how
peers within the group can help reduce these
costs, particularly in a situation where the prom-
ise of future credit depends on the timely repay-
ment of all members in the group. Joint liability
lending thus transfers these agency costs from
the bank onto the community of borrowers, who
can provide the same services more efficiently.
But perhaps the more difficult agency prob-
lem faced by lenders is that of adverse selection—
ascertaining the potential credit risk of the
borrower. Market failure occurs because safe
borrowers (who are more likely to repay) have to
subsidize risky borrowers (who are more likely
to default). Because the bank cannot tell a safe
borrower from a risky one, it has to charge the
same rate to all borrowers. The rate depends on
the mix of safe and risky borrowers in the popu-
lation. When the proportion of risky borrowers
is sufficiently large, the subsidy required (for the
lender to break even on all borrowers) is so high
that the lender has to charge all borrowers a sig-
nificantly high rate. If the rates are sufficiently
high, safe borrowers are unlikely to apply for a
loan, thereby adversely affecting the composition
of the borrower pool. In extreme cases, this could
lead to market failure—a situation in which
lenders do not offer loans because only the risky
types remain in the market!
Economic theory helps show how joint liabil-
ity contracts mitigate adverse selection (Ghatak
and Guinnane, 1999). Under group lending, bor-
rowers choose their own groups. A direct way in
which this might help is when a prospective
customer directly informs the bank about the
reliability of potential joiners. Perhaps a more
surprising result is that the lender can mitigate
the adverse selection problem even when cus-
tomers do not directly inform the bank but form
themselves into like groups (peer selection). That
is, given a joint liability clause, safe customers
will more likely group together with other safe
customers, leaving the risky types to form groups
by themselves. This “assortative matching” miti-
gates the adverse selection problem because now
the risky borrowers are the ones who must bail out
other risky borrowers, while the safe borrowers
have to shoulder a lesser subsidy. Consequently,
all borrowers can be charged a lower rate, reduc-
ing the likelihood of a market failure.
CURRENT STATE OF
MICROFINANCE
Since the inception of the Grameen Bank,
microfinance has spread to cover five continents
and numerous countries. The Grameen Bank has
6 See www.grameen-info.org/bank/GBGlance.htm. Other sources
put the annual rates charged by MFIs at around 30 to 60 percent.
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Honduras, India, Malaysia, Mali, the Philippines,
Sri Lanka, Tanzania, Thailand, the United States,
and Vietnam; the microfinance information
exchange market (MIX) lists financial information
for 973 MFIs in 105 different countries. Some
MFIs have also begun to seek out public and
international financing, further increasing their
amount of working capital and expanding the
scope of their operations. As MFIs have become
more efficient and increased their client base, they
have begun to expand their services through differ-
ent product offerings such as micro-savings, flexi-
ble loan repayment, and insurance. We discuss
these three different product offerings below.
At the time of their inception, many MFIs
included a compulsory savings component that
limited a borrower’s access to deposited funds.
This promoted long-term savings, but ignored
the fact that many poor save for the short term to
smooth consumption during seasonal lows of pro-
duction. Figure 2 provides a look at the distribu-
tion of voluntary MFI savings by region. As MFIs
have become better versed in the microfinance
market, they have applied their innovations in
lending to the collection of deposits. One of the
leading examples is SafeSave, located in Dhaka,
Bangladesh, which uses the idea that frequent
small deposits will guard against the temptation
of spending excess income. To keep the transac-
tion costs of daily deposits low, SafeSave hires
poor workers from within the collection areas
(typically urban slums) to meet with clients on
a daily basis. By coming to the client, SafeSave
makes it convenient for households to save; by
hiring individuals from the given area, training
costs and wages are also kept low. With this effi-
cient model for both the bank and individuals,
SafeSave has accumulated over 7,000 clients in
six years.7 Not surprisingly, microfinance deposits
(like microfinance loans) break from traditional
commercial banking experiences. The example
of Bank Rakyat Indonesia (BRI) suggests that the
poor often value higher liquidity over higher inter-
est rates on deposit products. In 1986, after a year
of field experiments, they offered two deposit
products: The TABANAS product offered a 12
percent interest rate but restricted withdrawals
to twice monthly, whereas the SIMPEDES prod-
uct offered an interest rate of zero but allowed
unlimited withdrawals. The SIMPEDES program
saw the largest gain in popularity and to this day
Sengupta and Aubuchon
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SOURCE: Microfinance Information Exchange Network; www.mixmarket.org.still offers a lower interest rate but maintains more
accounts than the TABANAS program.8
The original Grameen Bank was one of the
first MFIs that incorporated a compulsory savings
requirement into their lending structure. Every
client was required to make a deposit worth 5
percent of their given loan, which was placed
into a group fund with strict withdrawal rules
(generally no withdrawals before three years). In
2001, the Grameen Bank reviewed both its lend-
ing and savings policy and reinvented itself as
Grameen II. At the heart of this change were more
savings options and more flexible loans, which
act as a form of insurance. New to Grameen II is
a pension fund, which allows clients with loans
greater than 8,000 taka ($138) to contribute at least
50 taka ($0.86) per month. The client receives 12
percent per year in compound interest, earning a
187 percent return after the mandatory 10-year
wait. This scheme allows Grameen II to earn more
money in the present and expand services, while
delaying payment in the near future.
Grameen II serves as a good example of a sec-
ond innovation in microfinance: flexible loan
repayment. Group lending still exists and is an
integral part of the process, but Grameen II intro-
duced a flexi-loan that allows borrowers multi-
ple options to repay their loan on an individual
basis. Yunus (2002) stated that “group solidarity
is used for forward-looking joint actions for
building things for the future, rather than for the
unpleasant task of putting unfriendly pressure on
a friend.” The flexi-loan is based on the assump-
tion that the poor will always pay back a loan and
thus allows the poor to reschedule their loan
during difficult periods without defaulting. If
the borrower repays as promised, then the flexi-
loan operates exactly like the basic loan, using
dynamic incentives9 to increase the size of the
loan after each period. If the borrower cannot
make her payments, she is allowed to renegotiate
her loan contract rather than default. She can
either extend the life of the loan or pay only the
principle for an extended period of time. As a
penalty, the dynamic incentives of her loan are
reset; she cannot access larger (additional)
amounts of credit until the original loan is repaid.
Because her default now poses no threat to the
group promise of future credit, each member is
accountable only up to their individual liabilities.
The third offering is the addition of insurance
to microfinance loans. The most basic insurance
is debt relief for the death of a borrower, offered
by many MFIs, including Grameen. Other MFIs
have begun experimenting with health insurance
and natural disaster insurance. As with lending,
agency problems present a dilemma for micro-
insurance. To this end, some groups such as
FINCA Uganda require life insurance of all bor-
rowers, including “risky” and “healthy” alike and
thus avoid the adverse selection problem. Other
ideas include providing rain insurance to guard
against catastrophes. This relies on the assumption
that crop yields (and much of the developing
economy) are tied to seasonal rain cycles. This
innovation eliminates the problem of moral hazard
associated with a crop loan. By tying performance
to rain cycles, a farmer has no incentive to take
crop insurance and then fail to adequately pro-
duce a crop during a season of adequate rainfall.
A more recent phenomenon in microfinance
is the emergence of foreign investment in MFIs.
As more and more MFIs establish positive returns,
microfinance is being seen by many professional
investors as a profitable investment opportunity.
One of the most important developments for the
MFIs was the June 2007 release of Standard &
Poor’s (S&P) report on the rating methodology
for MFIs. By applying a common methodology,
S&P will be able to send a stronger signal to poten-
tial investors about the quality of MFI investments.
The process of debt offerings and securitization




As Yunus and the Grameen Bank began to
prove that microfinance is a viable method to
8 The SIMPEDES program does also use a lottery system to give
rewards, often worth 0.7 percent of deposits. More details are
available at the BRI web page: www.bri.co.id/english/mikrobank-
ing/aboutmikrobanking.aspx.
9 Dynamic incentives threaten to exclude defaulted borrowers from
future loans.
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began to spread around the world. It is difficult
to know exactly how many MFIs there currently
are, but Microfinance Information Exchange (MIX)
estimates range from 1,000 to 2,500 serving some
67.6 million clients. Of these 67 million, more
than half of them come from the bottom 50 per-
cent of people living below the poverty line.
That is, some 41.6 million of the poorest people
in the world have been reached by MFIs. MFIs
have expanded their operations into five differ-
ent continents and penetrated both rural and
urban markets. They have achieved success with
a variety of credit products and collection mech-
anisms. Table 1 provides a comparison of several
groups from around the world.
Banco Solidario (Bolivia)
Banco Solidario originally existed as the
Fundacion para Promocion y el Desarrollo de la
Microempresa (PRODEM), a non-governmental
organization (NGO) in the mid-to-late 1980s and
provided small capital loans to groups of three
or more people dedicated to entrepreneurial
activities. By 1992, PRODEM serviced 17,000
clients and disbursed funds totaling $4 million
dollars. Constrained by the legal and financial
regulations governing an NGO, the board of
directors decided to expand their services and
PRODEM became the commercial bank, Banco
Solidario, later that year. Currently, Banco Sol
has 48 branches in seven cities with over 110,000
clients and a loan portfolio of more than $172
million. As of March 31, 2007, Banco Sol reported
a past-due loans level of only 1.78 percent. An
important distinction between Grameen and
Banco Sol is the latter’s emphasis on returning a
profit with poverty alleviation stated only as a
secondary goal.
Banco Sol offers credit, savings, and a variety
of insurance products. Their initial loan offering
was based on Grameen-style joint-liability lend-
ing, offering a maximum of $3,000 per client to
groups of three or four individuals with at least
one year of experience in their proposed occupa-
tion. Using dynamic incentives, the size of the
loan is gradually increased based on good repay-
ment history. Annual interest rates average
Sengupta and Aubuchon
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Table 1
Characteristics of Select Microfinance Institutions
Enterprise
Grameen Bank, Banco Sol, Compartamos, Development Group,
Bangladesh Bolivia Mexico Washington, D.C.
Established 1983 1992 1990 1993
Membership 6,948,685 103,786 616,528 250
Average loan balance (US$) $69 $1,571 $440 $22,285**
Percent female 96.70% 46.40% 98.40% 30.00%
Group lending contracts? Yes Yes Yes No
Collateral required? No No No No
Portfolio at risk >30 days ratio 1.92% 2.91% 1.13% N/A
Return on equity 1.95%* 22.81% 57.35% N/A
Operational self-sufficiency 102.24%* 120.09% 181.22% 53%**
NOTE: *12/31/2005; **2004.
SOURCE: Data for this table come from the Microfinance Information Exchange (MIX) Network, which is a web-based platform:
www.mixmarket.org. Information was provided for the Enterprise Development Group because it is the only U.S.-based MFI that
reports data on the MIX network. Some of the information for EDG was taken from their 2003/2004 annual report, available at
www.entdevgroup.org. Comparable information is not available for the Southern Good Faith Fund, as the scope of their mission has
changed and expanded to more training-based programs. A more comprehensive summary chart exists in Morduch (1999).between 12 and 24 percent and can be anywhere
from 1 to 60 months in length (120 months for a
housing loan).10 With these higher interest rates,
Banco Sol does not rely on subsidies and, at the
end of 2006, posted returns on equity of 22.8
percent.
Compartamos (Mexico)
Compartamos is the largest MFI in Mexico,
servicing some 630,000 clients with an active
loan portfolio of $285 million. Located in Mexico
City, Compartamos is active in 26 Mexican states
throughout the country and services primarily
rural borrowers. Compartamos was founded in
1990 and began by offering joint-liability loans
to female borrowers for income-generating activ-
ities. Compartamos has only recently expanded
their services to allow men to borrow through
their solidarity group and their individual credit
program; still, around 98 percent of their borrow-
ers are female. In 1998, Compartamos formed a
strategic alliance with Accion International and
transformed into a regulated financial institution,
called a Sociedad Financiera de Objeto Limitado
(SFOL). In 2002, Compartamos took a unique step
for a MFI and became one of the first MFIs to issue
public debt, listing themselves on the Mexican
Stock Exchange. As an SFOL, Compartamos was
limited to only offering credit for working capital.
In order to offer more services, such as savings
and insurance programs, Compartamos became a
commercial bank in 2006.
Compartamos was one of the first MFIs to
raise additional capital funds through the sale of
domestic bond issuances. In 2002, Compartamos
was the first MFI in Mexico and one of the first
in Latin America to offer a bond sale. Because
this was Standard and Poor’s first attempt at rat-
ing a microfinance bond, they adapted their cur-
rent methodology and rated the bond using their
Mexican scale and assumed local buyers. S&P was
impressed with the diversified portfolio of debt
and offered Compartamos an MXA+ (Mexican
AA) rating. Reddy and Rhyne (2006) report that
their most recent bond was rated an MXAA
through the use of credit enhancements, allow-
ing them to place the bond with institutional
investors. Their fifth issue to date was three times
oversubscribed with 70 percent of the bond pur-
chased by institutional investors. By accessing
the commercial market, Compartamos has been
able to lower the cost of obtaining funds and, in
turn, offer better services to their borrowers, such
as absorbing the costs of providing life insurance
for all clients. Their efforts to improve operational
efficiency have also created a self-sufficient MFI
that has existed without subsidies for over a
decade.
Good Faith Fund (United States)
The Good Faith Fund was modeled after the
Grameen Bank and was one of the first MFIs to
be established in America. In 1986, while gover-
nor of Arkansas, Bill Clinton invited Muhammad
Yunus to visit and discuss microfinance. The
initial program was started as the Grameen Fund,
but the name was later changed to better reflect
the fund’s commitment to providing loans to
micro-entrepreneurs. Loans weren’t securitized
with collateral; rather, they were guaranteed on
“good faith” (Yunus, 2003, p.180).
As the Good Faith Fund grew, practitioners
and academics alike began to question the effec-
tiveness of a pure Grameen-style program in the
United States. Much like the original Grameen
Bank, the Good Faith Fund has relied on innova-
tion and change to apply microlending to the
rural economy of Arkansas. Taub (1998) argues
that the Good Faith Fund is a successful poverty
alleviation program, but that it is a poor eco-
nomic development program. In Taub’s words,
“the Good Faith Fund has never been able to
deliver a meaningful volume of customers, pro-
vide substantial loan services to the really poor,
or achieve anything close to institutional self-
sufficiency.” He argues that important social dif-
ferences arise because rural Arkansas is
inherently different from rural Bangladesh and
that these social differences cause the group
lending model to fail.
Group lending failed for several reasons, but
foremost was the inability of potential borrowers
to form a group. In Bangladesh, where poverty
10 Banco Sol, accessed July 27, 2007; www.bancosol.com.bo/en/
intro.html.
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than the those in the United States, potential
borrowers can more readily find other entrepre-
neurs. However, a close network of social ties
among the poor does not exist in rural Arkansas.
In response to this problem, Good Faith Fund
personnel established a mandatory six-week
training program for individual new members
and then created groups from the training pro-
grams. These newly formed groups of relative
strangers lacked the social cohesion to enforce
contract payments, unlike group members in rural
Bangladesh, who often live in the same village
and have family/community histories together.
Consequently, group lending was slowly phased
out of the Good Faith Fund. Today, the Good Faith
Fund focuses mainly on career training through
their Business Development Center and Asset
Builders program. They have also found a niche
in loaning larger amounts of money to small- and
medium-sized enterprises that are underserved
by the commercial banking center. These loans
provide the same service, but at $100,000 or more,
they can hardly be considered “micro” credit.
THE EVIDENCE ON
MICROFINANCE
In this section, we review some of the impor-
tant questions on microfinance. Our assessment
is based on numerous studies, technical surveys,
and newspaper reports on microfinance. The
attempt here is to be illustrative rather than pro-
vide a comprehensive review of microfinance.
Is Microfinance a Desirable Alternative
to Informal, Exploitative Sources of
Finance?
The spread of microfinance and the success
of MFIs in various countries around the world
prompts a question: Who served the poor before
the microcredit revolution? It is well known that
conventional banks, which act as creditors to most
entrepreneurial activity in the modern world, have
largely avoided lending to the poor. Instead, credit
to the poor has been provided mostly by local
moneylenders, often at usurious rates. Conse-
quently, moneylenders are typically perceived
as being exploitative, taking advantage of poor
villagers who have no other recourse to loans.
Therefore, it is not surprising that microfinance
has been welcomed by most as an alternative to
the abusive practices of village moneylenders.
However, this common perception requires a
more careful study: Why don’t mainstream banks
lend to the poor? In the banks’ absence, do local
moneylenders have monopoly power? More
importantly, are these high interest rates charged
by moneylenders welfare reducing?
We begin by listing the difficulties that arise
in lending to the poor. First, early studies believed
that poor people often lack the resources needed
to invest their borrowings to the most productive
use. In short, the poor borrow mostly to finance
consumption needs (Bhaduri, 1977; Aleem, 1990).
Second, even if loans could be earmarked for
investment purposes, commercial banks would
find it difficult to lend: Lack of credit histories
and documented records on small entrepreneurs
or farmers make it difficult for the bank to assess
the creditworthiness of the borrower. Finally, there
is the inability of the poor to post collateral on
the loans. This reduces the bank’s recourse to a
saleable asset once the borrower defaults on the
loan. Therefore, it is not difficult to see why com-
mercial banks have avoided lending to the poor.
On the other hand, it is believed that local
moneylenders could mitigate the problems faced
by outside banks in lending to the poor. Local
moneylenders are arguably better informed of
borrower quality and have more effective means
of monitoring and enforcing contracts than out-
side banks. In short, because of their social ties,
information, and location advantage, these mon-
eylenders are in a unique position to lend to the
poor. Some observers argue that usurious interest
rates in these markets can be explained by this
“monopoly” that the local moneylenders enjoy.
Several researchers have studied the market
structure of rural credit markets in developing
countries. Some argue that rural credit markets
are more competitive than previously imagined
because there is free entry for local moneylend-
ers if not outside banks. While there is no broad
consensus yet, most observers believe that despite
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enjoy some form of local monopoly power (in the
manner of monopolistic competition), at least in
the short run.
However, there are other reasons why money-
lenders charge high interest rates. First, money-
lenders have to compensate for the high
transaction costs of issuing and servicing a small
loan. Second, some observers believe that these
funds have high “opportunity costs”—that is,
moneylenders can earn high returns by investing
in their own farms. Finally, and this is despite
their local informational advantage, moneylenders
face some of the same problems as commercial
banks in identifying risky borrowers and securing
collateral, particularly in poor rural areas. A
simple numerical example helps illustrate this
result11: Consider two lenders with the same cost
of funds. Suppose now that the first lender oper-
ates in a prime market where borrowers faithfully
repay all of their loans at 10 percent, giving him
an expected 10 percent return. However, the sec-
ond lender operates in a poor rural market where
borrowers arguably have a higher rate of default,
say 50 percent.12 Consequently, her expected net
return is thus [￿1 + interest rate￿ * ￿1 – probability
of default￿ – 1]. Therefore, for the second money-
lender to earn the same 10 percent return, she
must charge an interest rate equal to 120 percent:
￿1 + 120%￿ * ￿1 – 50%￿ – 1 = 10%. This is not to
say that some moneylenders don’t engage in
price setting, but it does give a simple example
in which a moneylender can be competitive but
still charge extremely high interest rates.
Do moneylenders reduce welfare because
they charge high interest rates? To the extent that
borrowers willingly accept these loan contracts,
the answer is no.13 These loan contracts do gen-
erate a positive surplus ex ante. That is, only those
borrowers who expect to generate a rate of return
from their investment that is higher than that
charged by the moneylender will enter into these
contracts. Clearly, this situation can be improved
upon by offering lower rates: This would allow
more borrowers—i.e., those who expect to gener-
ate a lower rate of return on their investment—to
enter into loan contracts. However, this does not
mean that a high interest rate per se reduces wel-
fare. On the contrary, getting rid of moneylenders
or preventing them from offering loans at these
high rates can be welfare reducing; in their
absence, entrepreneurs with the highest returns
on their projects have no recourse to loans.
In contrast, MFIs can often offer lower interest
rates than local moneylenders because of their
higher efficiency in screening and monitoring
borrowers, which results from both their economy
of scale (serving more borrowers) and their use of
joint liability lending mechanisms. This lowers
the MFI’s cost of lending relative to that of the
local moneylender. To the extent that MFIs can
provide loans at a lower rate than moneylenders,
enabling more and more borrowers to enter the
credit market, is an argument for both the effi-
ciency (because of the reduced cost of funds) and
welfare enhancement (because of an increase in
the borrower pool) of microfinance.
How High are the Repayment Rates
for MFIs?
This is widely regarded as the greatest achieve-
ment of microfinance. Many MFIs report high
rates of repayment, often greater than 90 percent.
These claims have driven considerable academic
interest in why and how microfinance works.
Furthermore, these repayment rates are widely
cited in popular media (Business Week, July 9
and 16, 2007; Wall Street Journal, September 23,
2007) and have been one of the reasons for the
recent interest generated by microfinance in finan-
cial markets worldwide. Although the theories of
joint liability contracts, progressive lending,14
frequent repayments, and flexible collateral ade-
quately explain these high rates of repayment,
Morduch (1999) raises the important issue of
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12 Of course, Yunus believes that this wrong assumption is the root
of all the problems that the poor have in obtaining credit.
13 Bhaduri (1973) points to some degree of coercion in rural credit
markets, particularly in situations where landlords double as
moneylenders.validation. Because many of these repayment
rates are self reported, it is important to under-
stand the methodology used to calculate these
repayment rates.
Morduch studies the repayment rates for the
Grameen Bank for the 10-year period of 1985 to
1996. During this period, Grameen’s average loan
portfolio grew from $10 million to $271 million
and membership expanded more than 12-fold to
include 2.06 million members in 1996. For this
decade, Grameen reports an average overdue rate
of only 1.6 percent.15 Morduch’s contention is
that the Grameen Bank does not follow conven-
tional accounting practices and calculates the
overdue rates as the value of loans overdue (for
more than one year) divided by the current port-
folio, instead of dividing by the size of the port-
folio when the overdue loans were issued. Because
the size of the loan portfolio expanded 27-fold
during this 10-year period, the loan portfolio is
significantly larger at the end of any one year than
at the beginning. Morduch finds the adjusted
average default rate to be 7.8 percent for the same
10-year period. He makes the point that “the rate
is still impressive relative to the performance of
government development banks, but it is high
enough to start creating financial difficulties”
(Morduch, 1999, p. 1590).
As for these financial difficulties, Morduch
then focuses on reported profits, taking special
care to examine the provision of loan losses. He
finds that the bank is slow to write off bad loans,
dropping only a modest 3.5 percent of its portfolio
every year, again overstating the amount of profit.
He calculates that instead of posting a total of
$1.5 million in profits, the bank would have
instead lost a total of $18 million. The implica-
tions to Morduch’s findings are as follows: In the
early 1990s, to operate without subsidies, the
Grameen Bank would have had to raise interest
rates on its general product from 20 percent to
50 percent, and this would have raised the aver-
age interest rate on all products to 32 percent.
Morduch is careful to point out that it is unknown
whether or not borrowers would defect, because
for most borrowers the alternative is either no
loan or an even higher interest rate on loans from
a moneylender.
Although there is an apparent disagreement
between Morduch’s adjusted rates of repayment
and the Grameen Bank’s self reported rates, this
alone does not mean that Grameen is a financial
failure. In one case, the modest write-offs of bad
loans offer proof of Yunus’s organizational com-
mitment to the poor and the belief that, given time,
they will repay a loan. The since-implemented
Grameen II Bank builds on this concept and
allows borrowers to restructure a loan into smaller
payments or to take a scheduled amount of time
off, rather than default. Yunus describes the dif-
ference: “[The] overarching objective of the con-
ventional banks is to maximize profit. The
Grameen Bank’s objective is to bring financial
services to the poor, particularly women and the
poorest and to help them fight poverty, stay prof-
itable and financially sound. It is a composite
objective, coming out of social and economic
visions.” Given that the Grameen Bank’s focus is
largely on social objectives and not profit maxi-
mization, some have argued that it is not obligated
to adopt standard accounting procedures. What
is important is that Grameen is among the few
transparent microfinance organizations and
researchers have been able to review and evaluate
their financial statements.
An important consideration here is that MFIs
are known to charge considerably higher rates
compared with similar loans from conventional
banks. In their celebrated work, Stiglitz and Weiss
(1981) showed that the high interest rate that a
lender charges may itself adversely affect repay-
ment rates by either discouraging creditworthy
borrowers (adverse selection) or tempting the
borrowers to opt for riskier projects (moral hazard).
Consequently, the coexistence of high repayment
rates (around 95 percent) and higher interest rates
(a 30 to 60 percent interest rate is common) in
microfinance has “puzzled” economists.
One explanation offered by some economists
is that MFIs face an inelastic demand for loans.
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Braverman and Gausch (1986) found that government credit pro-
grams in Africa, the Middle East, Latin America, South Asia, and
Southeast Asia all had default rates between 40 and 95 percent.However, in a recent empirical study on the
SafeSave program in Dhaka slums, Dehejia,
Montgomery, and Morduch (2005) show that the
elasticity of demand for microcredit may be sig-
nificantly negative even though certain groups
of borrowers (particularly the wealthier ones) do
not reduce their demand when faced with higher
interest rates. However, Emran, Morshed, and
Stiglitz (2006) offer a more promising explanation
for this puzzle. Departing from the traditional
focus on credit markets in studies of microfinance,
the authors examine the implications of missing
or imperfect labor markets for poor women in
developing countries (the typical customers of
MFIs in Bangladesh). Emran, Morshed, and
Stiglitz (2006, p. 4) demonstrate “the critical role
played by the structure of the labor market in
making the small-scale household-based invest-
ment projects ‘credit worthy’ in the face of very
high interest rates, especially for the poor house-
holds with little or no collaterizable assets.”
Is There More to Microfinance than
Group Lending or Joint Liability
Contracts?
The success of microfinance in generating
high repayment rates led many economists to
investigate the reasons behind this success. The
mid-to-late 1990s witnessed a large increase in
the number of journal articles on group lending
contracts, as economists sought to explain how
microfinance “succeeded” where traditional
forms of lending had failed. Joint liability con-
tracts were seen as the break from traditional
lending mechanisms and economic theory was
used to readily explain how these contracts
helped to improve repayment rates. The growth
of the literature on group lending contracts in the
mid-1990s offers the impression that all MFIs
operate as such, but the reality is that MFIs use a
variety of lending techniques, such as dynamic
and progressive loans, frequent repayment sched-
ules, and nontraditional collateral to ensure high
repayment rates among poor, underserved borrow-
ers. These mechanisms were either introduced
independently or in conjunction with joint liabil-
ity programs such as Grameen’s and in many cases
operate alongside group contracts. Practitioners
and theorists alike have now realized that these
mechanisms can operate with individual contracts
and in certain cases (e.g., in areas of low popula-
tion density) offer better repayment results than
group lending schemes.
The mechanism of progressive lending guards
against the borrower’s strategic default at the end
of a loan cycle, because by definition she has little
or no collateral to be seized in the event of default.
Instead, MFIs have offered small initial loans,
with the promise of future credit for timely repay-
ment. The offer of future credit serves as a power-
ful incentive for a micro-entrepreneur trying to
grow her business. In this scenario, a borrower
will default only if her current income is greater
than her future expected profits. With a small ini-
tial loan for a beginning entrepreneurial venture,
this is unlikely. To further increase the likelihood
of repayment, MFIs use dynamic lending, in
which the size of the loan is gradually increased
with each successive loan repayment. Now, the
expected future profits are almost certainly
greater than current earned income because the
size of the loan continues to grow.
Another mechanism used by MFIs is that of
frequent repayments, which often begin even the
week after the loan is disbursed. By requiring
small repayments before the business venture
has reach maturity, MFIs are essentially requiring
that borrowers have a second source of income
and, hence, borrow against their current consump-
tion. This allows MFIs to screen against high-risk
borrowers from the beginning because borrowers
will be able to repay the loan even if their venture
fails. Indeed, weekly repayments give the borrow-
ers and lenders the added benefit of discovering
problems early. Armendáriz de Aghion and
Morduch (2005) also suggest that frequent repay-
ments provide better customer service, contrary
to the belief that more repayments raise the trans-
action costs for the borrower by requiring more
travel to and from payment centers. Instead, fre-
quent repayments help borrowers with savings
constraints such as seasonality of income, family
members dropping by to borrow funds, or discre-
tionary spending by one or more of the family
members. When coupled with dynamic incen-
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savings deposits that will be paid with interest
(the graduated size of the next loan). This allows
families to break free of certain savings constraints
(such as those noted above) because the loan is
paid each week, before the money can be spent
on anything else.
The final mechanism is the requirement of
nontraditional collateral, which was introduced
by banks such as Bank Rakyat Indonesia (BRI).
This feature breaks from the commercial practice
that collateral submitted must have a resale value
equal to the loan. In a group lending contract,
joint liability often serves as collateral, but BRI
operates on the “notional value” of an item and
allows collateral to be any item that is important
to the household, regardless of market value. This
may include the family’s sole domestic animal,
such as a cow, or it may be land that is not secured
by title. Neither item could be sold for much of a
profit without significant transaction costs to the
bank, but both items would be even more difficult
and costly for the family to do without.
Armendáriz de Aghion and Morduch (2000)
offer evidence of the success of individual loans
that use progressive/dynamic incentives, frequent
repayments, and nontraditional collateral to
guarantee a loan. Using data from Eastern Europe
and Russia, they demonstrate that individual
loans can generate repayment rates greater than
90 percent (and above 95 percent in Russia). In
industrialized settings, borrowers are more likely
to face more competition, making it more costly
to form a borrowing group. In this scenario, loan
products will go to different entrepreneurs, with
different expected payoffs—hence, necessitating
different loan amounts. A group contract can be
inefficient because it imposes a ceiling on the
loan size equal to that given to the smallest mem-
ber of any potential group. They conclude by
suggesting that in areas that are relatively indus-
trialized, individual loan models may perform
better than traditional group lending models.
Is Microfinance an Important Tool for
Poverty Alleviation?
Microfinance started as a method to fight
poverty, and although microfinance still fulfills
this goal, several institutions have sought to make
a distinction between the “marginally poor” and
the “very poor.” The broadest definition distin-
guishing these two groups comes from the
Consultative Group to Assist the Poorest (CGAP),
which defines the poor as individuals living
below the poverty line and the poorest as the
bottom half of the poor. The World Bank estimates
that in 2001, some 1.1 billion people had con-
sumption levels below $1 and another 2.7 billion
lived on less than $2 per day.16 As microfinance
continues to grow, questions have started to focus
on who is the optimal client. Should microfinance
target the marginally poor or the extremely poor?
Morduch (1999) tries to answer this question
by considering two representative microfinance
clients, one from each poverty group described
above. The first client belongs to a subsidized
microfinance program and her income is only 50
percent of the poverty line. The second client
belongs to a financially sustainable program that
accordingly charges higher interest rates. To
ensure repayment of the loan at the higher rate,
the second borrower is chosen to be marginally
poor, that is, with an income of 90 percent of the
poverty line. Using the widely used “squared
poverty gap” (Foster, Greer, and Thorbecke, 1984)
measure of poverty, Morduch suggests that a
dollar increase in income for the very poor bor-
rower has a five times greater impact than the
same dollar for the marginally poor borrower.
This simple example would suggest that, in
terms of poverty alleviation, MFIs should focus
on the poorest borrowers first, but this is not
always the case. As MFIs seek to become finan-
cially independent, they find themselves serving
only the marginally poor. This is an important
distinction between Grameen and Banco Sol of
Bolivia: The latter’s emphasis is on returning a
profit, and alleviating poverty is seen only as a
secondary goal. Not surprisingly, Banco Sol
charges higher interest rates,17 does not rely on
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http://web.worldbank.org.
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www.bancosol.com.bo/en/intro.html.subsidies, and at the end of 2006 posted returns
on equity of 22.8 percent.18
This apparent dichotomy between financial
independence and poverty alleviation also gets
to the heart of a different problem. At what point
does a successful MFI begin to look like a regular
bank? If the MFI successfully serves poor clients,
then those clients should be able to use their loans
to lift themselves out of poverty. Because of the
nature of progressive and dynamic loans, success-
ful borrowers earn access to larger loans, helping
them break free of poverty even faster.
The Grameen Bank has found a way to make
this dichotomy work for them and now uses their
economy of scale to create a financially independ-
ent bank without raising interest rates. In 1995,
the Grameen Bank decided not to request any
more funds from donors and instead began to
fund the bank from collected deposits. With more
than two decades of successful borrowers behind
them, Grameen has had a chance to build up sav-
ings deposits slowly, to the point that it is now
self-sustainable, based on the amount of funds
provided by members. In a rough sense, it is now
the more-successful poor that are subsidizing
new clients. This is a significant step, especially
considering that, from the decade of 1985 to 1996,
Armendáriz de Aghion and Morduch (2005) cal-
culate that Grameen accepted $175 million in
subsidies, including both direct donations and
“soft” donations such as soft loans, implicit sub-
sidies through equity holdings, and delayed loan
loss provision.
Is Microfinance Sustainable or Even
Profitable?
With all of the positive publicity surrounding
microfinance, it may be surprising to learn that
not all MFIs are sustainable or able to return a
profit. Despite their rapid growth and sound
operations based on strong theoretical platforms
(such as using group loans, dynamic incentives,
and frequent repayments), less than half of all
MFIs return a profit and most still require the
help of donors and subsidies. A lack of financial
sustainability doesn’t necessarily indicate a failing
MFI, but rather raises questions about the mission
and direction of that particular MFI. Even with
subsidies, many MFIs remain the most cost-
effective method to alleviate poverty; and, as we
argued previously, subsidies can help change the
profile of the targeted client from the poor to the
extremely poor.
For an MFI to be sustainable can mean one of
two things: The organization can be operationally
sustainable or it can be financially sustainable.
An MFI that is operationally sustainable raises
enough revenue to cover the cost of operating
the business—paying loan supervisors, opening
branch offices, etc. Subsidies might still be used
to issue loans or cover defaulted loans. An insti-
tution that is financially sustainable does not
require any subsidized inputs or outside funds
to operate. Instead, it raises money through its
lending operations. The MicroBanking Bulletin
(2003) surveyed 124 MFIs with a stated commit-
ment to becoming financially sustainable. In their
survey, the Bulletin found that only 66 operations
were sustainable, a rate just slightly above 50
percent. As Armendáriz de Aghion and Morduch
(2005, p. 232) note, all 124 programs asked for
help in managing their accounting standards and,
hence, “in terms of financial management, [these
124 programs] are thus skimmed from the cream
of the crop.” Similar sustainability data do not
exist for the other 2,000+ MFIs; but, without simi-
larly strong commitments to financial sustain-
ability, the percentage of sustainable operations
is likely to be much lower than 50 percent.
Subsidized credit is financed in a variety of
forms, some of which have been discussed briefly
with the Grameen Bank example. MFIs also secure
funds from donors, many of whom want to alle-
viate poverty but have not seen strong returns in
the nongovernmental organization (NGO) or gov-
ernment sector. For many, donations and subsidies
are intended as a method to get MFIs started. But
without any accountability or empirical research,
it is difficult for donors to decide at what point
an MFI should forgo its dependence on outside
funds. Lacking in this debate is a clear under-
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18 MIX Market financial data are from BancoSol, accessed 8/2/07;
www.mixmarket.org/en/demand/demand.show.profile.asp?
token=&ett=280.standing of how subsidies affect the supply and
demand of loans. Without subsidies, interest rates
may rise; and, as standard demand theory sug-
gests, fewer loans will be requested. Moreover,
rising interest rates without subsidies may exclude
poorer projects, thus raising average returns. But,
they may also increase the moral hazard problem;
at higher interest rates, only risky borrowers
apply for a loan, thus increasing the default rate
and lowering returns. Finally, it is unclear what
affect subsidized lenders have on the overall
credit supply. Do they segment the credit market
while serving the very poor or do they squeeze
out other lenders, reducing overall efficiency for
the market?
In some instances, government institutions
collaborate with local MFIs; but, more often than
not, government organizations and MFIs are at
odds with one another, despite the fact that both
share the stated goal of reducing poverty. A prime
example of the failure of government subsidized
initiatives in the market for microcredit is the
Integrated Rural Development Program (IRDP),
which allocated credit based on social targets in
rural India, giving 30 percent of credit to socially
excluded groups and 30 percent to women.
Armendáriz de Aghion and Morduch (2005)
report that between 1979 and 1989 IRDP offered
over $6 billion in subsidized credit but generated
loan repayment rates below 60 percent, with only
11 percent of borrowers taking out a second loan.
During the same decade, the Grameen Bank also
accepted subsidies in a variety of forms, but did
not change their lending model to include social
targets. During this time, the Grameen Bank saw
its membership grow to half a million members,
with repayment rates above 90 percent. The expe-
rience of the Grameen Bank and IRDP during the
late 1970s and early 1980s is important because
of the similarities between regions. Both
Bangladesh and India are densely populated,
rural, agrarian economies with high rates of
poverty. Therefore, it is likely that the Grameen
Bank's comparative success during this period is
indicative of a more efficient lending model rather
than variances in their lending environment.
In sum, even if many MFIs are not financially
sustainable, the microfinance movement may
still be the best per-dollar investment for alleviat-
ing poverty. Further research is needed to show
whether financial sustainability is even a desired
objective, and future work could help understand
how different subsidy mechanisms can best bal-
ance financial sustainability with the desired
social objectives.
Could Competition Among MFIs Lead
to Better Results?
At first glance, standard economic theory
suggests that competition should improve the
performance of MFIs and lead to better service
and lower interest rates. With such a large poor
population and high rates of growth, there is also
a large market to support more MFIs. Historically,
though, competition has failed to increase services
and often decreases the rate of repayment. When
clients have access to alternative sources of credit,
MFIs lose the leverage they gain from dynamic
incentives and progressive loans (i.e., future loans
are contingent on repayment).
During the late 1990s, Bolivia and Banco Sol
experienced a microfinance crisis. As the success
of Banco Sol increased and commercial banks
began to see the profitability in an MFI model,
competition increased. General economic theory
suggests that competition is inherently good, but
for the early MFIs, competition reduced efficiency
by weakening the incentives: As credit options
increased for borrowers, the incentives inherent
in a dynamic or progressive loan became weaker.
This proved difficult for Banco Sol, whose model
relies on group lending and dynamic incentives.
The competition mainly came from Acceso FFP,
a Chilean finance company that paid its employ-
ees on an incentive system. Within three years,
Acceso had 90,000 loans, and Banco Sol lost 11
percent of its clients. Regulated MFIs in Bolivia
saw their loan overdue rates increase from 2.4
percent to 8.4 percent in just over two years.
Because of the increased competition, Banco Sol
saw its return on equity fall by 20 percentage
points to only 9 percent in 1999 (Armendáriz de
Aghion and Morduch, 2005, p. 127).
In their study of 2,875 households from 192
villages in Thailand, Ahlin and Townsend (2007,
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with increased access to credit, borrowers do not
respond to dynamic incentives. Moreover, strong
social ties, such as the clustering of relatives in a
village, can also lower repayment rates in the same
manner of competition. In their words, “this
result has not been seen in the previous empirical
research,norfocusedoninthetheoreticalmodels.”
In the early years of competition in the micro-
finance sector, MFIs struggled to maintain a credi-
ble threat of denying future credit on default. In
recent times, however, new regulation has helped
to promote competition in Bolivia as lenders
started to share more information on borrowers.
By law, Banco Sol and other regulated financial
intermediaries are now required to report the
name and national identification number of
delinquent borrowers to the Superintendent of
Banks and Financial Institutions. This informa-
tion is available to all financial intermediaries
through both formal and informal agreements.
This agreement helped to strengthen the threat
of dynamic incentives, and, as a result, competi-
tion among lenders has led to an increase in their
client base.
Does Microfinance Have Any Social
Impact in Terms of Female
Empowerment and Education?
Any review of microfinance is incomplete
without a discussion of its impact on women.
The Microcredit Summit Campaign Report (2000)
lists over a thousand programs in which 75 per-
cent of the clients were women. Yunus (2003)
recounts the initial difficulties overcoming the
social mores in rural Bangladesh and lending to
women in this predominantly Islamic nation.
However, his efforts were rewarded and 95 per-
cent of the Grameen Bank’s current clients are
women.
This focus on women follows largely from
Yunus’s conviction that lending to women has a
stronger impact on the welfare of the household
than lending to men. This has been confirmed
by a large volume of research on microfinance.
In countries where microfinance is predominant,
country-level data reveal signs of a social trans-
formation in terms of lower fertility rates and
higher literacy rates for women. Pitt and
Khandker (1998) show that loans to women have
a positive impact on outcomes such as children's
education, contraceptive use, and the value of
women's non-land assets. Khandker (2005) finds
that borrowing by a woman has a greater impact
on per capita household expenditure on both
food and non-food items than borrowing by a
man. Among other things, this also improves
nutrition, health care, and educational opportu-
nities for children in these households. Smith
(2002) validates this assertion using empirical
data from Ecuador and Honduras to compare
microfinance institutions that also offer health
services with institutions that offer only credit.
He notes that, “in both countries, health bank
participation significantly raises subsequent
health care over credit-only participation.” In
particular, he found that participation in MFIs
that offer health services reduces the tendency to
switch to bottle feeding as incomes rise. He notes
that breast-feeding children under age two is a
key health-enhancing behavior.
A pro-female bias in lending works well for
the MFIs. Practitioners believe that women tend
to be more risk averse in their choice of invest-
ment projects, more fearful of social sanctions,
and less mobile (and therefore easier to monitor)
than men—making it easier for MFIs to ensure a
higher rate of repayment. Various studies from
both Asia and Latin America have shown that
the repayment rates are significantly higher for
female borrowers compared with their male
counterparts.
However, critics have argued that microfi-
nance has done little to change the status of
women within the household. A much-cited
paper by Goetz and Gupta (1996) points to evi-
dence that it is mostly the men of the household
and not the women borrowers who actually exer-
cise control over the borrowings. Moreover, micro-
finance does little to transform the status of
women in terms of occupational choice, mobility,
and social status within the family. Therefore,
microfinance hardly “empowers” women in any
meaningful sense. Although this may truly be
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finance has provided heretofore unrealized work-
ing opportunities for women with limited skills
in traditional activities.
Can the Microfinance Experiment Be
Successfully Replicated Anywhere in
the World?
Although the microfinance revolution has
recorded success in most developing countries
of the world, it has achieved little success in
some of the more developed nations. The most
notable example here is the Good Faith Fund in
Arkansas, where microfinance has failed to deliver
the same rapid growth and poverty alleviation as
it has in the developing world. This seems reason-
able given the relatively smaller percentage of
those living in poverty and the much larger safety
net afforded the poor through welfare and unem-
ployment programs. As Yunus (2003, p. 189)
states, “In the developed world, my greatest
nemesis is the tenacity of the social welfare sys-
tem…[M]any calculate the amount of welfare
money and insurance coverage they would lose
by becoming self-employed and conclude the
risk is not worth the effort.” Yunus correctly
addresses a motivating factor for the relatively
weak success of microfinance in the United
States, but studies have found other reasons why
microfinance has failed to deliver: e.g., a lack of
entrepreneur opportunities for the poor, lack of
group structure, and the multitude of options
facing the U.S. poor.
Why Did Microfinance Initiatives Fail in
the United States? In their study of U.S. micro-
finance, Edgcomb, Klein, and Clark (1996) find
that micro-enterprise accounts for only 8 to 20
percent of all jobs—because of the availability
of wage jobs and public assistance. When com-
pared with the 60 to 80 percent of jobs supplied
by micro-enterprise in the developing world,
the pool of potential microfinance beneficiaries
in the United States is substantially smaller.
Schreiner and Woller (2003) make the point that
the characteristics of the poor are different in
the two regions. In the developing world, jobs
are relatively scarce and hence the unemployed
are more likely on average to include individuals
that are highly skilled or better motivated to
become entrepreneurs. In contrast, in the United
States, where poverty is much less prevalent,
most individuals with the aforementioned char-
acteristics can find jobs. Furthermore, the amount
of small business regulation in the United States
poses problems; a micro-entrepreneur must know
their proposed business but must also under-
stand local and federal tax laws and regulations.
To compete with much larger national markets,
small business owners must further understand
and excel at marketing their products in both
local and larger markets. The lack of highly
skilled or better-motivated workers among the
poor in the United States, combined with the
higher entry costs for successful micro-enterprise,
makes successful microfinance initiatives more
difficult. Schreiner (1999) finds that, in absolute
terms, only one person in a hundred was able to
move from unemployment to self-employment
through micro-enterprise.
Taub (1998) offers a slightly different expla-
nation: He found that the markets for the borrow-
ers differed between regions. In Bangladesh, most
small entrepreneurs engage in goods-producing
activities that, when combined with their small
local markets, offers an almost immediate stream
of revenue. This feature allows the Grameen Bank
and others to require weekly repayments, which
is often cited as a primary reason for their high
repayment rates. In the United States, most entre-
preneurs engage in service-producing activities
because it is difficult to compete against the
economies of scale in goods production and dis-
tribution within the U.S. market. These service
businesses provide a relatively unreliable source
of income, particularly in the early stages. This
risk, combined with the safety net afforded to the
poor through welfare, discourages many potential
entrepreneurs from starting a new venture. In
support of this point, Taub found that the likely
borrower comes from a family with at least one
source of steady income, so that their new ven-
ture is unlikely to substantially hurt their family
resources.
In the late 1980s, the Good Faith Fund demon-
strated the difficulty of forming a cohesive group
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and Woller (2003) offer four basic failures of group
formation in the United States. First, they suggest
that the impersonal nature of U.S. market inter-
actions reduces the need for social reputations
and hence the group loses the ability to punish
delinquent borrowers. Second, the U.S. poor are
diverse and hence it is difficult to find other poor
potential entrepreneurs to guarantee a group loan.
In U.S. markets, there is also a limit to the poten-
tial number of small-business ideas. In developing
countries, a group of borrowers may all enter the
basket-making market with success because of the
much larger local economy. The group guarantees
the loan but also offers advice to help succeed in
the market. In the United States, the demand for
micro-businesses is much smaller and diverse
groups of people must start diverse business ven-
tures. There is little value to the group outside of
a loan guarantee because group members don’t
share the same risk to their businesses. Third,
defaults are often not enforced in group settings,
as found by Hung (2003). Finally, groups often
break down in the United States because the poor
have access to other forms of credit. This credit
may be more attractive because it doesn’t require
the transaction costs of dealing with a group.
For the United States, pure Grameen-style
group lending schemes have failed to deliver sub-
stantial results, but that is not to say they have
not benefited the poor. Rather, microfinance oper-
ations in the United States have often switched
to individual lending operations that require
borrowers to attend mandatory small business
training programs or offer loans to attend spe-
cialized schooling for particular professions. A
fundamental difference is that microfinance in
the United States helps place the poor into exist-
ing wage-earning jobs rather than create new jobs.
The additional training substantially raises costs
to the point that many U.S. MFIs are not self-
sustaining, instead relying on grants and subsi-
dies. Edgcomb, Klein, and Clark (1996) found
that the average cost to make and service a loan
was $1.47 per dollar lent, with a range of costs
from $0.67 to $2.95. Without charging usurious
interest rates, it can be difficult to earn such a
similarly high return, particularly with the smaller
microfinance market. Taub (1998) reports that
from 1989 to 1992, the Good Faith Fund averaged
only 18 new loan customers per year.19 In the
following years, the average number of new loan
customers rose into the mid 20s, before a change
in management and change in focus substantially
reduced those numbers. With small loans, aver-
aging just $1,600 per year for the first four years,
it became impossible for the Good Faith Fund to
even come close to matching the combined staff
salaries of $450,000.
Due in part to these high-cost structures,
Bhatt, Tang, and Painter (2002) found direct evi-
dence that nearly a third of MFIs started in
California in 1996 had ceased to exist by 1998.
Instead of focusing on becoming self-sufficient,
Schreiner (2002, p. 82) argues for more quantita-
tive evaluation of MFIs. He claims that “the dirty
secret in micro-enterprise is that few evaluations
are really tests…[E]valuations were funded and
conducted by people who already believed that
micro-enterprise was worthwhile.” Schreiner
thus concludes that a main goal in helping alle-
viate poverty should be to evaluate the efficiency
of MFIs and, if need be, reallocate resources to
other training programs that specialize in poverty
alleviation, not economic development.
THE FUTURE OF MICROFINANCE
The number of MFIs has been growing
steadily, and the top 100 MFIs are increasing
their client base at a rate of 26 percent per year.20
To fund this spectacular growth, MFIs have turned
to a variety of sources, many of which rely on
funding from local sources to guard against for-
eign currency risk. MFIs are currently moving
into the international market and confronting
challenges such as developing standard rating
methods; guarding against foreign currency risk
and country risk; and meeting the large volume
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19 At the time of Taub’s study, population density in Bangladesh
was 814 per square kilometer, while the population densities of
Arkansas counties served by the Good Faith Fund were only 36,
9, 8, 9.1, and 10.33 per square kilometer (Jefferson, Lincoln,
Desha, Chicot, and Ashley counties, respectively).
20 MIX Market analysis of top 100 MFIs; www.mixmarket.org.requirements for an international offering. But,
according to Reddy (2007) of Accion International,
“Many believe that savings mobilized from local
depositors will ultimately be the largest source
of capital for microfinance. Foreign capital pro-
vides 22 percent of funding for the ‘Top 100’ MFIs,
but savings is the first source of capital, represent-
ing 41 percent of all assets in 2005.”21 Many MFIs
have a mandatory or suggested savings rate; and,
for larger loans, MFIs will often require borrowers
to deposit 5 percent of the loan back into a savings
account. Some, but not all, have restrictions on
when and how that money can be accessed.
Although not the main source of funding,
foreign capital still represents a significant por-
tion of current funding for the top 100 MFIs. As
Elizabeth Littlefield of CGAP found, U.S. invest-
ment in foreign microfinance in 2006 was $4 bil-
lion, which is more than double the 2004 total of
$1.6 billion. This funding comes from two main
sources: international financial institutions and
microfinance investment vehicles. To access this
foreign investment, MFIs are beginning to use new
vehicles of debt-structured finance, including
collateralized debt obligations (CDOs) and
securitization.
To date, one of the most well-known interna-
tional debt issues was structured by Blue Orchard
Finance in 2004. This deal, worth $40 million,
linked 90 investors with nine MFIs in Latin
America, Eastern Europe, and Southeast Asia.
The main innovation of the Blue Orchard deal
was the introduction of a tiering system (of five
tranches) that allowed for different risk appetites
among investors. Microfinance is also beginning
to raise money in the equity market, through
organizations such as Accion Investments, which
has invested $12.4 million in five institutions
(Reddy and Rhyne, 2006).
In 2006, the first securitized microfinance
receivables went on the market from the
Bangladesh Rural Advancement Committee
(BRAC). BRAC is an NGO that lends money to
the extremely poor, focusing mainly on offering
women credit to develop their own income-
generating activities. The transaction was struc-
tured by RSA Capital, CitiGroup, the Netherlands
Financing Company, and KfW Bank of Germany
and has securitized $180 million in receivables
over a period of six years.
According to CitiGroup, 65 percent of the
loans are to the extremely poor, who borrow from
$50 to $100. BRAC offers three loans, based pri-
marily on the land holdings of the borrower. For
those with less than one acre of land, borrowers
can obtain from $50 to $500 at a flat 15 percent
rate, payable over one year through 46 weekly
installments. The marginally poor, those who
own more than one acre of land and are involved
in agricultural enterprise, can qualify for loans
between $166 and $833 with a flat 15 percent
interest rate. This product must be repaid in equal
monthly installments, with a 12- or 18-month
horizon. Finally, BRAC offers larger loans to entre-
preneurs to start their own business. These loans
are monthly products (12, 18, or 24 months) with
a 15 percent interest rate.22 BRAC employs a
dynamic lending scheme, wherein timely repay-
ments guarantee future access to credit. This
mechanism is similar to a joint lending liability,
except in this case borrowers are liable to their
future selves.
International Financing Review Asia honored
the BRAC deal with the title of best securitiza-
tion in Asia Pacific for 2006 because “one of the
most impressive aspects of the transaction is the
way that it deals with the sheer complexity of a
dynamic pool that will contain about 3.3 million
short tenor loans for which the average outstand-
ing principal is around US$95.”23 The security
was given an AAA rating from the local
Bangladesh markets, with CitiGroup and
Netherlands Financing Company each purchasing
one-third of the certificates. The remaining one-
third was split among CitiGroup Bangladesh and
two local Bangladeshi banks.
This deal differs from the collateralized
debt obligations that Blue Orchard Loans for
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21 Data taken from MIX Market analysis of the top 100 MFIs;
www.mixmarket.org.
22 See BRAC’s economic development and microfinance information
at www.brac.net/microfinance.htm.
23 CitiGroup: “Innovative BRAC Microcredit Securitization honored
in Bangladesh,” accessed 1/16/07; www.citigroup.com/citigroup/
press/2007/070116b.htm.Development issued in April 2006, in which
funding for 21 MFIs from 12 countries was pack-
aged into a $99.1 million commercial investment.
The main difference between a CDO and securi-
tization is that a CDO relies on the ability of the
MFI to repay the loan, unlike a securitized loan
that relies on the underlying borrowers to repay.
A CDO is another vehicle to bring mainstream
investors to microfinance, but is still limited by
the ability to rate the creditworthiness of differ-
ing MFIs. To help with this issue, S&P released a
rating methodology for microfinance in June 2007.
By applying a common methodology, S&P will
be able to send a stronger signal to potential
investors about the quality of MFI investments.
It is unclear yet whether the 2007 subprime mort-
gage meltdown in the United States will have an
effect on investors’ risk appetites for more collat-
eralized securities and whether microfinance
securities will be viewed as “subprime” loans.
Walter and Krauss (2006) argue that the
opposite should be true—namely, that microfi-
nance can reduce portfolio volatility—and their
empirical tests show that microfinance institu-
tions have a low correlation to general market
movements. They suggest that this phenomenon
is brought on by the continuous and diverse fund-
ing through international donor agencies and
because micro-entrepreneurs may be less inte-
grated into the formal economy. When markets
enter a downturn, micro-entrepreneurs may expe-
rience a countercyclical effect, as consumers
shift their consumption downward to cheaper
goods.
Outside of international credit markets,
microfinance has continued to receive grassroots
support and popular media coverage. Organiza-
tions such as Kiva.org serve as intermediaries
and connect individual donors with micro-
entrepreneurs. Kiva.org allows individuals to
choose a business, originate their own micro-loan,
and in return receive electronic journal updates
and payments from their borrower. Most loans are
small, between $50 and $100 and have repayment
terms from six months to a year, but the lender
does not receive any interest on their loan. Rather,
journal updates and progress reports serve as
interest, letting lenders know that their money
has been put to good use. At the end of the year,
providers can start the cycle anew or withdraw.
To date, 128,547 individuals have lent over $12
million with a self-reported repayment rate greater
than 99 percent. Popular media outlets such as
the Wall Street Journal (September 23, 2007,
August 21, 2007, October 21, 2006), New York
Times (March 27, 2007, December 10, 2006),
National Public Radio (September 7, 2007,
June 19, 2007, April 6, 2007), and others have
given Kiva.org frequent and broad exposure, mak-
ing the microfinance movement as accessible to
lenders as the Grameen Bank made microcredit
accessible to borrowers.
CONCLUSION
With the recognition of the Nobel Peace Prize
in 2006, Muhammad Yunus’s vision of extending
credit to the poor has reached a global level.
Microfinance is not a panacea for poverty allevi-
ation; but, with committed practitioners, a wealth
of theoretical work, and a surging demand for both
international and individual investment, micro-
finance is a poverty-alleviation tool that has
proven to be both effective and adaptable. Through
innovations in group lending and dynamic incen-
tives, MFIs have been able to successfully lend to
those traditionally ignored by commercial banks,
because of their lack of collateral and credit scores.
The poor have responded in kind, by repaying
their loans with significant repayment rates. As
MFIs have grown and reached new clients, they
have continued to innovate by offering individual
loans, savings options, and life insurance and
seeking new forms of capital in domestic and
international markets. Microfinance has spread
to five continents and hundreds of countries, yet
its success in U.S. markets has been ill-defined,
as lenders struggle with higher transaction costs
of offering loans and starting micro-enterprises.
As more and more MFIs become self-sufficient
and continue to expand their client base, it will
be the duty of all parties concerned with poverty
relief to look for other ways to innovate. For now,
microfinance remains a viable solution to eco-
nomic development and poverty alleviation, both
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transparency from institutions and better rating
standards, the influx of investment capital from
international markets will continue to drive
microfinance toward Yunus’s goal of a poverty-
free world.
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